


**MARITIME INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE
Serious Marine Accident (during
egress via adjacent vessel)
Small Commercial Vessel
'Normandy Trader'
21st NOVEMBER 2024**





The Jersey Administration, on behalf of the appointed Minister, conducts marine safety and other investigations on ships flying the flag of the Bailiwick of Jersey and ships which are not flying the Jersey flag which are within Jersey waters in accordance with the obligations set forth in international conventions to which Jersey is a party (either directly or through the United Kingdom).

In accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, mandated by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, investigations have the objective of preventing marine casualties and marine incidents in the future and do not seek to apportion blame or determine liability.

It should be noted that provisions in the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2012 require Masters, Officers and Owners of vessels to provide such information as is reasonably required by those appointed to conduct such investigations.

If the contents of a report were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings relating to an accident there is a risk that this could offend the principle that individuals cannot be required to give evidence against themselves.

It is for this reason that the Minister is prevented under the above law from authorising publication of a report until a decision has been made not to prosecute any individual in connection with the incident concerned or any prosecution including any appeal has been completed.

The Jersey Administration makes this report available to any interested individuals, organizations, agencies or States on the strict understanding that it will not be used as evidence in any legal proceedings anywhere in the world. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. Any material used must contain the title of the source publication.

The obligation to publish accident and incident reports in accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, is an acceptable reason for publication of this report in its current format under data protection legislation.



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GLOSSARY

AHM	Duty Acting Harbourmaster (Duty officer maintaining Port Operations, oversight of VTS, and additionally performing a Search and Rescue Mission Coordination role on behalf of the Harbour Master)
DPA	Designated Person Ashore; a member of the shore management of a shipping company, with access to the highest level of management. The DPA is appointed to oversee the operation of the Safety Management System of a company's vessels, guide continual improvement, and act as a link between the crew and senior management.
IRB	Inflatable Rescue Boat (those operated by Jersey Fire and Rescue Service are based on RNLI 'D' Class and powered by an outboard Engine)
PFD	Personal Floatation Device (Inflatable means of flotation, similar to a life jacket but with slightly less buoyancy, used to keep a person afloat.)
Safe Haven	A harbour or shelter of any kind which affords entry, subject to prudence in the weather conditions prevailing, and protection from the forces of the weather.
TPA	Thermal Protective Aid (a blanket like device designed to prevent heat loss from a person who had been either injured or immersed).
UTC	Standardised international time equivalent to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), the 'winter' time for the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands
VHF	Very High Frequency radio
VTS	Vessel Traffic Services (Manages the movements of vessels within defined limits of a port and its approaches on behalf of the Harbour Master)



1.0 SYNOPSIS

1.1 At 1521 UTC on Thursday 21st November 2024 a Deck Rating from the workboat 'NORMANDY TRADER' was disembarking the vessel, via a fixed vertical quayside ladder on the Victoria Quay in St Helier harbour, Jersey, having traversed the deck of the sister vessel 'NORMANDY WARRIOR'. The Skipper had preceded him ashore, and the Deck Rating was the last person aboard, leaving both vessels unmanned.

1.2 As the Deck Rating reached the top of the ladder, reaching for the top rung with his right hand, his right hand slipped from the top rung causing him to pivot to his left side and lose his grip in the ladder. He fell approximately seven metres into the water below, between the vessel and the quay.

1.3 The Skipper, who was already on the quayside, heard a shout and a splash and turned back to investigate. He reached the top of the ladder in time to see the Deck Rating surface in the vicinity of the ladder 'about three-quarters down' and grasp hold of the ladder. The injured Deck Rating was able to communicate with the skipper and was described as 'reasonably responsive'.

1.4 The Skipper called to a friend on the quay and asked them to call for an ambulance and then descended the ladder to assist the crew member in the water. The Deck Rating had started to climb the ladder but realised he had some kind of injury to his left knee as, in his words, "It was difficult to use."

1.5 The Skipper was able to assist the Deck Rating in his climb until both were level with the deck of the 'NORMANDY WARRIOR' (the inboard vessel). Both then transferred to the NORMANDY WARRIOR, with the Deck Rating initially seated on the vessel's rubber fendering, to rest and assess the situation.

1.6 The Skipper then assisted the Deck Rating to remove his 'rucksack' and fleece before assisting him fully aboard NORMANDY WARRIOR and, with difficulty, to descend to that vessel's empty cargo deck adjacent to the accommodation entrance. The original intention was to take the Deck Rating into the accommodation to 'warm up' but this was reassessed due to the casualty's pain level and the need for his subsequent extraction. Instead, the Skipper attempted to keep the casualty warm and protected until assistance arrived. Due to the immediate response of the Skipper the above actions were completed in about five minutes.

1.7 The Ambulance service was the first on the scene and had advised both Jersey Coastguard and the Jersey Fire and Rescue Service, both of whom also dispatched units to the scene. The Paramedics on scene decided not to access the vessel via the fixed ladder and intended, as an alternative, to use the nearby fishing vessel J666 (THE DON) on the adjacent 'London Berth for access to NORMANDY WARRIOR. By 1532 the Duty Acting Harbourmaster (AHM) for Jersey Coastguard and the Ambulance service were on scene with the Jersey Fire and Rescue Service arriving a few minutes later.

1.8 The Fire and Rescue service started to prepare for extracting the casualty using a harness, but then a combined reassessment with the other services determined that extraction of the casualty would best be achieved via the NORMANDY WARRIOR's bow ramp and one of the Fire Service's Inflatable Rescue Boats which was deployed to the scene and would effect a transfer of the casualty to a waiting ambulance at the nearby slipway. ('Old Lifeboat Slip'). The Skipper of the NORMANDY TRADER therefore lowered the NORMANDY WARRIOR's bow ramp to the waterline. (FIG 5)



1.9 The transfer of the Injured person to the ambulance, via the rescue boat, was completed by 1624. The Injured person was found to have fractured his left tibia and was detained in hospital pending an operation. He was discharged from hospital on Wednesday 27th November and, at the time of completion of this report, was still undergoing physiotherapy.

1.10 CASUALTY VESSEL DETAILS

Type : Commercially Coded Workboat (Ro-Ro - originally built as a military vessel)

Name:	Normandy Trader	Registration Number:	ON743683
MMSI:	235091173	IRCS:	2FGY2
Registered Length:	23.16m	Length Overall:	26.30m
Beam :	6.37 m	Draft :	2.5 m
Net Tonnage :	73.98T	Gross Tonnage :	73.98T
Engine Make/Model:	2 x Volvo TAMD-63P	Max continuous engine power	537 kW.
Propulsion:	Twin Screw		
Year of Build:	1965 (rebuilt 1998)	Date of Registration:	23 rd June 2015

2.0 NARRATIVE

General description:

2.1 NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR are both small (under 24m Load line length) commercial workboats of 26m LOA who are operated by Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd, part of the Jersey Oyster Company, to transport shellfish and general cargo between Jersey, the other Channel Islands, the French ports of Granville and St Malo, and occasionally ports on the UK south coast.

Round trip To Granville prior to the accident.

2.2 Prior to the accident Normandy Trader had completed a round trip to the French port of Granville. Before departing for Granville at 1700 on 20th November 2024 (with 3 Tonnes of cargo consisting of six pallets and one motor car), standard pre-departure checks had been completed, the vessel having been berthed alongside the West Cross berth since 1430 on 14th November 2024. NORMANDY TRADER arrived alongside at Granville No 5 berth the same day, at 2000 UTC, and the crew rested aboard until 0630 UTC the following morning when cargo work commenced.

2.3 Cargo operations were complete by 1030 UTC (The 77 tonnes of cargo loaded consisting of bagged Granite, Sand, miscellaneous pallets, car parts, and a bicycle). Departure preparations then took place prior to the vessel's departure for St Helier at 1100 UTC.

2.4 After an uneventful voyage, NORMANDY TRADER was all fast on the West Cross Berth, Victoria Pier, St Helier at 1500 UTC on 21st November 2024. NORMANDY TRADER berthed Starboard side to and outboard of MV NORMANDY WARRIOR (both vessels 'bows East'). MV Ronez, a 60m long specialised cement carrier was occupying the adjacent East Cross Berth on the same quay. (See FIG.1)



Environmental conditions:

2.5 At the time of the incident conditions were as follows:

Wind: Direction: North East Speed: 17 (gusting 25) Knots

Weather: Heavy Rain /sleet had passed through between 1200 and 1400 easing to light rain

Tide Height: 3.5 m (just before Low water @ 1630 UTC)

Air Temperature: 2-3 C

Sea Temperature: 14 C

Crew Disembarkation

2.6 The presence of the RONEZ precluded the normal cargo discharge position for NORMANDY TRADER, in the centre of the Victoria Quay and discharge of the NORMANDY TRADER had therefore been planned for after departure of RONEZ the following morning. Having berthed outboard of the NORMANDY WARRIOR, the NORMANDY TRADER's crew therefore shut down the vessel and prepared to disembark.

2.7 In order to reach the quayside it was necessary for the crew of the NORMANDY TRADER to first transfer across to the NORMANDY WARRIOR. The hulls of two vessels being the same size and height with the wheelhouses in the same position, slight differences in design of deck edge protection of the two vessels meant that there was no alignment between gaps or gates to facilitate cross decking and that the crew therefore had to climb over at least one set of rails to reach the other vessel. (See Fig 2 & FIG 2A). Both crew members successfully transferred to the NORMANDY WARRIOR using a step across method, there being no gangway rigged between the two vessels.

2.8. Once aboard the NORMANDY WARRIOR further disembarkation to the top of the Victoria Quay was via a fixed vertical steel ladder (See FIG 3 and FIGS 3A to 3C). This ladder was one of five similar vertical ladders on the Victoria Quay, two of which were associated with Landing stages with fitted platforms at 6m and 9m above chart Datum (half-tide, and $\frac{3}{4}$ tide for spring tides). The construction of the ladder concerned approximated to the Design Standard Guidance with respect to styles, tread width, diameter, and separation, and the separation of fixing brackets. Protection for the ladder was provided by chains supporting vertical rubber tubular fenders on the quay edge on either side.

2.9 The skipper was the first to leave the vessel and was not directly supervising the subsequent disembarkation of the Deck Rating. Neither the Skipper nor the deck rating were wearing Personal Floatation Devices.

2.10 The Deck Rating was dressed in a fleece, and was wearing a rucksack, when he climbed the ladder. As he reached the top of the ladder the Deck Rating reached for the top rung with his right hand and started to move his left hand to grasp the ladder extension above the quay edge. At this point his right hand slipped from the top rail, which was wet and cold. As a result his body started to pivot anticlockwise, coming away from the ladder and initially retaining contact with his left hand and foot. As the rotation away from the ladder continued, the Deck Rating lost purchase with his hand and left foot and fell, facing west and with NORMANDY TRADER to his right and the eastern (left hand) side of the ladder in front of him. The Deck Rating then fell into the water between the vessel and the quay and between the ladder and the adjacent eastern protective fender. It is likely that he fractured his left tibia when his left shin struck one of the ladder's fixing points as he fell.



immediate actions:

2.11 The Skipper had negotiated the ladder without difficulty and was walking towards his car, parked on the opposite side of the quay, when he heard a shout and then a splash. Fearing the worst he ran back to the ladder calling to a friend on the quay to call 999 for an ambulance and the fire service. When he arrived at the top of the ladder the Deck Rating was not visible.

2.12 The Skipper then saw the Deck Rating surface next to the ladder and assessed him as 'reasonably responsive'. The latter started to climb back up the ladder but immediately realised he had sustained an injury to his left lower leg as it was difficult to use.

2.13 At this point the Skipper descended the ladder to assist. He made the Deck Rating secure on the ladder and assessed his responsiveness and pain level. He then assisted the Deck Rating to ascend the ladder while keeping the NORMANDY WARRIOR off the quay, until both were able to adopt a seated position on the vessel's rubber deck-edge fendering. (FIG 2A & 4)

2.14 Following rest and a further assessment, during which the Deck Rating's rucksack, wet outer clothing and certain other items were removed, the Skipper assisted the injured Deck Rating aboard the NORMANDY WARRIOR just forward of the wheelhouse (FIG 2).

2.15 The Skipper then assisted the Deck Rating, with some difficulty, to the NORMANDY WARRIOR's cargo deck using the fixed access ladder (FIG 2A). The Skipper's initial intention was to assist the Deck Rating into the accommodation to remove further wet clothing and keep him warm. This plan was however reassessed due to the Injured Person's significant pain level and in order to minimise the difficulty for his eventual extraction. Instead, the Skipper concentrated in making the Deck Rating comfortable and keeping him warm, placing a cushion on deck for insulation and utilising a TPA, the Skipper's own waterproof jacket, towels, and an umbrella (it having started to rain once more). Due to the prompt action by the Skipper this whole process was completed in approximately five minutes. (FIG 3B & FIG 4)

2.16 When the Ambulance service arrived at 1532UTC the Skipper provided an initial assessment and, as the Paramedics did not wish to access the NORMANDY WARRIOR using the vertical ladder, an alternative plan for access utilising the fishing vessel 'THE DON' (J666) was developed. The care of the injured person was handed over to the paramedics and, once they arrived on scene, the Jersey Fire and Rescue Service boarded the vessel to assist with the extraction of the casualty using a harness.

2.17 This initial plan for the disembarkation of the casualty was reviewed and, in conjunction with the AHM, an alternative plan agreed to transfer the casualty to the ambulance utilising one of the Fire and Rescue service's Inflatable Rescue Boats (IRB). The casualty would be placed in a stretcher, the NORMANDY WARRIOR's bow ramp would be lowered, the casualty transferred to the IRB, launched from the old lifeboat slip to which the IRB would return and at which the ambulance would be positioned for onward transfer to hospital.

2.18 The Skipper then lowered the NORMANDY WARRIOR's bow ramp and briefed the Fire Service and Paramedics on safe transfer across the ramp and securing of the IRB (FIG 5). The casualty was transferred to a stretcher and then via the IRB to the shore and the waiting ambulance. (Completed by 1624 UTC) (FIG 4 and 4A to 4C) All units were stood down at 1633.



3.0 SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

3.1 The Skipper contacted his DPA (Designated Person Ashore) and shore Management (1549) as well as St Helier VTS on completion of the incident. The operating company immediately commenced its own safety investigation.

3.2 The Ports of Jersey HQSE Manager was requested to attend the incident at 1540 and at 1630 the Senior Maritime Standards Manager was requested to lead the Marine Accident investigation with the HQSE Manager supporting the investigation. Arrangements were immediately made for both the Minister (for Sustainable Economic Development) and the Health and Safety Inspectorate (HSI) to be notified to ensure that the requirements under the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2002 and Health and Safety at work (Jersey) Law 1989 with respect to investigations were met. The Owners were requested to complete a 'Commercial Vessel Incident Form' and update on the condition of the injured party. Information from CCTV at St Helier VTS was secured together with the coastguard /VTS incident log and meteorological data.

3.3 On 22nd November 2024 the HSI confirmed that PoJ Maritime Standards should carry out the investigation and advised accordingly. They retained a position as 'a substantially interested party.' The initial accident report was received from the vessel with statements from the Master and the injured Deck Rating.

3.4 On 27th November 2024 the Marine Accident Investigation team met with the vessels' operators including the skippers of both vessels and their accident investigation team to review progress and cover various items of interest and investigation. An update on the condition of the injured Deck Rating, who had been discharged the previous day after an operation on his left leg and signed off work for an initial period of 6 weeks, was provided; together with an updated statement from the injured party.

4.0 CREW

4.1 Both NORMANDY TRADER and sister vessel NORMANDY WARRIOR are coded to operate in Category 2 areas (no more than 60NM from a 'safe haven'). The Minimum Safe Manning Documents of both vessels, issued by the Jersey Ship's Registry require a crew of a Skipper (holding either an STCW II/2 Master <200GT or an MCA/RYA commercially endorsed Yachtmaster Offshore Certificate of competency and a Deck Rating, holding STCW basic certification or equivalent. (The vessel was approved to carry a maximum of fifteen persons on voyages less than 24 hours or three persons (crew) on voyages of over 24 hour's duration. The vessel operated with either two or three crew, an additional crew member being carried for larger loads or for voyages over 24 hours.

4.2 Neither vessel is currently certificated to carry passengers to/from Jersey in accordance with Regulation 6 of the Harbours (Inshore Safety) (Jersey) Regulations 2012; as any additional personnel carried are employees of the owners and operators.

4.3 All crew members, who were trained to sail on either vessel, additionally carried out shore-based activities for the vessel owners as required. As both vessels were under 80GRT there was no requirement, under the Harbours (Jersey) Regulations 1962, for the vessel to be continually manned whilst alongside and crew only embarked when needed for passages, maintenance, or cargo operations. Hours of Rest records for November 2024 showed that STCW/ILO Hours of rest were observed.



4.4 The skipper of Normandy Trader on 21st November was a 28-year-old British National. He was the holder of a certificate of competency as Yachtmaster Offshore (endorsed as 'valid for commercial use aboard vessels subject to the codes of practice issued by MCA' and approved by the Jersey Maritime Administration) which had been issued by the RYA and MCA on 19th January 2022. The skipper had been employed by Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd as a 'Skipper/Crew Member' since 30th November 2022 and was also the holder of a valid Local Knowledge Endorsement, issued by the Harbour Master on 22nd June 2022, covering Jersey Territorial waters and the outlying reefs.

4.5 The Deck Rating (injured person) was a 49-year-old British National and had been employed as a 'Crew Member' by Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd since 25th May 2016. The Deck Rating had valid safety training for his role except that his ML-5 Certificate of Medical Fitness (unrestricted) issued on 19th June 2019 had expired on 18th June 2024 and had, on the date of the accident, not been renewed.

4.6 Crew Hours of Work and Rest:

4.6.1 The hours of Work and Rest for both the Skipper and the Deck Rating were compliant with STCW and ILO requirements: They also met the requirements of the Article 10 of the Employment (Jersey) Law 2003. There is no evidence that either the Skipper or the Deck Rating were suffering from Fatigue.

4.6.2 Hours of Rest Skipper: 19th Nov24 1430 to 20th Nov24 0800; 20th 1200 to 1630; 20th 2030 to 21st 0630 (after accident Rest from 1630) he had 10 hours rest in the previous 24 hours (and 132 hours rest in the previous 7 days).

4.6.3 Hours of Rest Deck Rating: 19Nov24 1700 to 20Nov24 0730 and rest aboard 1600-1700; rest after arrival Granville 20th 2000 to 21st 0630. In the 24 hours prior to his accident the Deck Rating had 11.5 hours rest and was about to go on rest, and 114 hours rest in the relevant 7-day period.



5.0 Photographs

FIG 1 - Vessels alongside: Ronez (East Cross), Normandy Trader (outboard), Normandy Warrior (inboard) & Access Ladder



FIG 2 - Access between vessels – FIG 2a






FIG 3 – Ladder Access to the Quay – Fig 3A




FIG 3B – Ladder Access to the Quay – Fig 3C






FIG 4 – Evacuation of casualty – FIG 4A



FIG 4B – Evacuation of Casualty - FIG 4C



FIG 5 – Bow Ramp Normandy Trader & Normandy Warrior






FIG 6 – Victoria Quay- East Cross, West Cross & London Berth



FIG 6A - Victoria Quay – East Cross





FIG 6B - Victoria Quay – WEST CROSS



6.0 FINDINGS

General

6.1 MV NORMANDY TRADER berthed outboard of sister vessel NORMANDY WARRIOR on West Cross berth on Victoria Quay St Helier Jersey at 1500 UTC (Local time) on Thursday 21st November 2024. The NORMANDY TRADER had just completed a return voyage to the French port of Granville

6.2 The East Cross berth was occupied by the 60m long bulk carrier RONEZ, which was discharging cement. RONEZ was scheduled to depart the following day after which NORMANDY TRADER would move to the berth ahead of the NORMANDY WARRIOR to discharge the inbound cargo (77 tonnes of cargo consisting of bagged Granite, Sand, miscellaneous pallets, car parts, and a bicycle) which would have provided access via either of two vertical ladders (See FIG 6A) one of which operated in conjunction with a tiered landing stage with granite stairs (the landings at 6 and 9m above chart datum reducing the height of any climb and providing an opportunity for vessels to utilise gangways.

6.3 With both NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR being under 80 GRT there was no port requirement for either vessel to be permanently manned when alongside in St Helier. The standard practice was for the two vessels to be rafted up (bows East) with moorings set to allow for them to be unattended with a maximum Tidal range of up to 12 metres. With no one aboard either vessel, normal procedures for access from the shore was via a fixed vertical steel ladder on the quay.



The set moorings could result in a significant amount of vessel movement, especially when the lines became increasingly slack as the tide rose.

Crew

6.4 Both the Skipper and the Deck Rating on NORMANDY TRADER were appropriately qualified and experienced for service aboard the vessel; except that the Injured Party (Deck Rating) had allowed his ML-5 Medical Fitness certification to expire some five months previously and this had gone unnoticed by the seafarer himself, the skipper, and the company's shore management. Although technically the Deck Rating was not qualified to sail on the vessel without a valid medical fitness certificate there is no available evidence that any underlying health issues were a contributory factor to the Deck Rating's fall.

6.5 Hours of work and rest records for November 2024 show that both the Skipper and the Deck Rating were appropriately rested at the time of the incident, having rested aboard alongside in Granville the previous night, although both were about to go on rest. There is no evidence that fatigue was a contributory factor.

Personal Protective Equipment

6.6 Working lifejackets and Personal Floatation Devices (PFD) together with other appropriate PPE were available for the crew of both NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR. Although the stevedores operating the adjacent East Cross berth keep their PPE in a weatherproof locker on the quay, the practice on both vessels was to leave their PPE aboard.

6.7 The working lifejackets used on NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR were not fitted with integral Personal Locator Devices (PLB) that would activate automatically on entry into the water.

Transfer between vessels:

6.8 Although NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR had identical hull dimensions and were under the same ownership the layout of their deck railings at the bridge deck were different and the access gate on NORMANDY TRADER did not align with the gap in the railings of NORMANDY WARRIOR when the vessels rafted up. This made transfer between the vessels using the 'step across' method more hazardous than would otherwise be the case as it required the crew members to climb over one set of railings to cross between the vessels. (FIG 4A)

Victoria Quay Access Ladders

6.9 The ladder used was one of four steel ladders spaced alongside the Victoria Pier covering both East and West Cross berths (see FIGs 6 6A and 6B). All, except for the ladder on the central landing stage which is recessed, are proud of the quay edge and protected by vertical cylindrical fenders.

6.10 All the ladders are designed and fitted in accordance with both the general provisions of 'Code of Safety in Docks and Outlying Harbours (Jersey)', and the ladder design standards associated with the Ports Skills and Safety SIP021 and UK MGN 591 (Amendment 2) 'Provision of safe means of access to fishing vessels and small vessels in ports.'



The ladder in use (FIG 3, 3A, 3B, & 3C)

6.11 Although satisfactorily constructed and safe to use at the time of the accident, post-accident inspection of the ladder used identified areas where improvements should be considered. These are as follows:

6.11.1 The ladder is protected by vertical cylindrical rubber tubular fendering hung from chains (Fig 3) the fendering when installed was of different sizes with smaller diameter fenders on the Eastern side which do not provide as much protection (see 6.11.3 below).

6.11.2 As is clearly illustrated in FIG 3 there is a gap in the ladder's fendering with the top five rungs on the Eastern side and the top eight rungs (just below the second mounting bracket) on the Western side left unprotected.

6.11.3 As a consequence of 6.11.2 above (see FIG 3 and FIG 3B) previous vessel contact in way of approximately the third and fourth steps from the top had slightly indented the ladder so that the second to sixth steps were slightly out of alignment to the vertical. This damage was considered minor and, as it had left the ladder both safe and usable, had not been reported by either the operators or the crew of NORMANDY TRADER or NORMANDY WARRIOR or during routine inspections by Ports of Jersey staff. It is not considered that the above minor damage contributed to the accident.

6.11.4 The ladder was attached to the quay by steel fixing brackets of angled steel at intervals within the suggested 2460mm separation. (FIG 3 and FIG 3B) The flat horizontal face and right-angled profile of these brackets, coupled with the smaller diameter fendering on the Eastern side of the ladder, were reported to have caused damage to spherical inflated fenders used on NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR in the past. It should be noted that no such reports had been received prior to the accident.

6.11.5 Subsequent to the incident it was reported that the lowest fixing points to the ladder had become weakened allowing a degree of movement. This defect would only be apparent visually at the lowest tides. It was also reported that the upper rungs of the ladder that were only immersed during spring tides were smoother and had less grip than those lower down that were regularly immersed and then dried.

6.12 The Injured crew member believes that he struck his left leg below the knee on one of the mounting brackets as he fell causing the fracture to his left tibia. It is considered likely that this was the case.

Embarkation and Disembarkation

6.13 Although utilising a vertical quayside ladder as the principal means of access and egress to NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR, there was no requirement within the vessels' Safety Management System for such access to be supervised.

6.14 Although it was recognised that this ladder was the principal means of access and egress to NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR, a lifebuoy with light and line was not positioned on the quay side guard rails on the western side of the ladder. There were no such guard rails on the Eastern side of this ladder.

6.15 The practice had developed with a single crew member boarding and leaving the vessel alone. As a result, the Skipper did not consider that he needed to remain to witness the Deck Rating's disembarkation.



6.16 Additional Personal floatation devices for embarkation and disembarkation were not stowed in protective lockers on the quay and consequently the PFDs were left aboard.

6.17 The absence of a storage locker on the quay also contributed to the practice of crew carrying their personal effects up and down the ladder when embarking or disembarking the vessel, as there were no heaving lines located adjacent to the ladder to assist with this process. The Deck Rating therefore wore his rucksack and not a PFD when disembarking from NORMANDY TRADER via the quayside ladder.

6.18 The weather conditions with the cold temperatures and sleet and rain immediately before the incident are likely to have made climbing the ladder more difficult. It is not possible to determine whether anything that had been washed off the quay by the rain had made the upper rungs, which were in any event reported to have less grip than those further down, more slippery.

6.19 The small rucksack worn by the Deck Rating impeded his ability to self-recover via the ladder when he entered the water. Had the contents of the rucksack been heavier, or if assistance had not been readily available this could have had significant consequences.

6.20 Although it is recognised in the available industry guidance that there are significant difficulties associated with providing fall arrest protection on quayside ladders, and such equipment is therefore not usually provided, the absence of such a system enabled the Deck Rating to fall a significant height and sustain injury as a result.

6.20.1 Any fall prevention system provided as part of a vessel's Safety Management System would need to be easy to rig and use, compatible with any PFD worn, and operable at the top or bottom of the ladder for access and egress if it is to be consistently used.

Rescue and Recovery.

6.21 Having sustained a lower limb fracture during his fall the Deck Rating was faced with severe difficulty in extracting himself from the water.

6.22 The presence in the vicinity and the prompt actions of the Skipper were key to the successful outcome of this incident. He immediately recognised the seriousness of the situation and, fortunately, ensured that the alarm was raised before attempting to help.

6.23 It was unfortunate that the Skipper when requesting his friend to dial 999 did not request him to ask for the Coastguard as that would have facilitated coordination of the incident and potentially allowed for waterborne assets to be deployed. In the event the Fire Service deployment was only implemented once the paramedic's arrived on scene.

6.24 The skipper had not worn a PFD when disembarking and did not have one immediately available to him when he assisted the Deck Rating. This created a potential hazard as there was a risk of cold-water shock on entering the water due to the water temperature being less than 15C.

6.25 The Skipper's assistance to the Deck Rating enabling him to be recovered to the NORMANDY WARRIOR was both timely and effective. Having decided to render immediate assistance, without waiting for the Emergency services, his reassurance and assistance was key to a successful outcome until handing over care of the casualty to the Emergency services.

6.26 The assistance and collaborative working between the Ambulance service, the Fire and Rescue services and the Coastguard and Jersey Harbours facilitated a safe outcome. Utilising the bow ramp



of the NORMANDY WARRIOR and the Fire Service Inflatable Rescue Boat to transfer the casualty by stretcher to an ambulance on the 'Old Lifeboat Slip'.

Subsequent actions

6.27 There was prompt liaison between the operating company, Ports of Jersey, the office of the Minister for Sustainable Economic Development and the Health and Safety Inspectorate to ensure that the incident was promptly investigated and information between the Marine Accident Investigation and the operator's own investigation was shared.

Casualty's Injuries

6.28 The Deck Rating sustained a fractured left tibia, spent several days in hospital, and required surgery on his leg. He is expected to make a full recovery.

7.0 CONCLUSION

7.1 The crew of the NORMANDY TRADER disembarked via the NORMANDY WARRIOR and the adjacent vertical ladder because both vessels were to be left unmanned.

7.2 The NORMANDY TRADER's Deck Rating fell from the vertical ladder when he lost his grip on the top rung of the ladder, which may have been made more slippery due to the weather conditions, because there was no form of Fall Prevention Device in use.

7.3 It is likely that the Deck Rating fractured his left Tibia when he struck on of the Ladder's securing lugs as he fell seven metres into the water between the Quay and NORMANDY WARRIOR

7.4 The risk to the crew of the NORMANDY TRADER (and NORMANDY WARRIOR) was increased as it had become the practice not to wear PFDs when embarking or disembarking the vessel as these were stored aboard the respective vessels.

7.5 The risk of carrying personal effects whilst climbing or descending ladders, or doing so by wearing a ruck sack, instead of using a heaving line was not fully appreciated.

7.6 Although the operators normally had a container on the quay, because it was removed from time to time there was no dedicated storage for crew Personal Protective Equipment or heaving lines.

7.7 Prompt action by the Skipper and the attendance of the emergency services resulted in the injured Deck Rating being safely recovered to first the NORMANDY WARRIOR and then by boat transfer to an ambulance ashore.

7.8 The injured crew member is still undergoing Physiotherapy, and it is hoped that he will make a full recovery.



8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 To Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd

8.1.1 Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd are recommended to review their risk assessments and standard operating procedures relating to crew embarkation and disembarkation from NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR, with particular reference to the wearing of PFDs (and possible integral PLBs). The review should determine whether the quay side ladder should remain the principal means of access and egress to the vessels or if alternative tendering operations from adjacent pontoons are preferable.

8.1.2 In any event Normandy Trader Freight services should ensure that crew members do not climb or descend ladders whilst wearing ruck sacks or carrying any items. If ladders are to remain the primary means of access/egress a review could also determine whether a fall prevention device suitable for use in conjunction with the vertical ladder and Personal Floatation Devices should be provided.

8.1.3 Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd should review their 'lone working' procedures to ensure that access and egress to vessels laid up alongside is supervised.

8.1.4 Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd should seek to provide suitable quayside storage for crew PPE and heaving lines.

8.1.5 Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd are requested to consider, in conjunction with their vessels' Certifying Authority, modifying the ship's side railings on one or both vessels to facilitate transfer between them when 'rafted up' alongside each other.

8.1.6 Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd. have conducted a review of their crew certification processes and procedures to ensure that all statutory certification remains valid, and issue appropriate reminders to Skippers and Crew Members; records of crew certification checks are included within the vessels' Safety Management Systems.

8.2 Recommendations to Ports of Jersey Ltd.

8.2.1 A full review of current inspection processes with respect to quayside ladders including a detailed inspection of all quayside ladders on the Victoria Quay (East & West Cross berths) should be carried out including the following:

8.2.1.1 Carrying out any necessary repairs to the securing of the lower part of the westernmost ladder and if necessary to the distortion of the upper rungs, or replacing the ladder concerned.

8.2.1.2 Improving the fendering on the westernmost ladder to cover the full tidal range and replace the fendering on the eastern side with cylindrical tubular fenders of the same diameter as those currently fitted to the western side

8.2.1.3 Consider whether any modifications to the ladder securing brackets might improve ladder safety or security.

8.2.2 Ports of Jersey should consider whether quayside protection, similar to that provided to the west of the westernmost ladder, should be fitted for a 2m length to the east of the ladder concerned.



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8.2.3 If the ladder is to continue to be used as the principal means of access /egress for NORMANDY TRADER and NORMANDY WARRIOR Ports of Jersey should consider fitting a lifebuoy with an attached line and light to the quayside railing immediately adjacent to the ladder concerned.

8.2.4 In addition to the publication of this report, Ports of Jersey should consider issuing a Safety Bulletin comprising lessons learned from this accident to those from the Marine Safety Investigation into the fatal accident to a crew member transferring between M.V. GRANVILLE and MV VICTOR HUGO on 23rd July 2023. An accident that also involved a crew member moving between vessels that were rafted up and accidentally entering the water.

8.2.5 Noting that due to its operation most of the quay edge of the Victoria quay must remain unguarded, that the area is not formally a 'Restricted Area, and that public access was not an issue on this occasion; Ports of Jersey should consider expediting the current arrangements for completion of security fencing around the cargo working areas on the Victoria Quay to prevent unnecessary access to the quay side ladders, whilst ensuring access to emergency services is maintained.

8.2.6 Carefully consider any request by Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd or its parent company to provide suitable quayside storage for crew PPE and similar equipment or securing points for any fall prevention devices.

8.2.7 Ports of Jersey should review the current published 'Code of Practice for Safety in Docks and Offlying Harbours (Jersey)' (Issue 2 2024) and any associated Harbour Master's General Directions and make such amendments as are considered appropriate.

8.3 It has been agreed that this report is shared with the Health and Safety Inspectorate at the consultation stage so that the final version gives due consideration to their input. Consideration should be given to sharing this report, the GRANVILLE/ VICTOR HUGO report and the resulting Safety Bulletin with both MARS and CHIRP and with Ports Skills and Safety .



9.0 SHIP PARTICULARS (IMO Casualty Investigation Code format)

Vessel's name	NORMANDY TRADER
Flag	JERSEY
Classification Society	N/A (Certifying Authority: MECAL)
IMO number	N/A (Official Number: 743683)
Type	Workboat (MGN280 Cat 2) Ro-Ro
Registered owner	Normandy Trader Freight Services Ltd
Manager(s)	As above
Construction	Steel
Length overall	26.30m
Registered length	23.16m
Gross tonnage	73.98
Minimum safe manning	2 (3 for voyages over 24 Hours)
Authorised cargo	General Cargo

VOYAGE PARTICULARS

Port of departure	Granville (France) (21Nov2024/1100 UTC)
Port of arrival	St Helier (Jersey) (21Nov2024/1500 UTC)
Type of voyage	Coastal
Cargo information	Bagged Construction material
Manning	2
Date and time	21 st November 2024, 15:21 UTC
Type of marine casualty or incident	Serious Marine Casualty (Serious Accident)
Location of incident	Victoria Quay (West Cross Berth) & adjacent moored vessels NORMANDY TRADER & NORMANDY WARRIOR (recovery from Cargo deck of NORMANDY WARRIOR)
Place on board	
Injuries/fatalities	1 x Serious Injury (fractured tibia (L))
Damage/environmental impact	None
Ship operation	Vessels laid-up alongside
Voyage segment	After arrival at destination.
External & internal environment	Wind NE 17-25Kts, Weather: previous heavy rain/sleet, Air Temp: 2-3C Sea Temp: 14C
Persons on board	2 (in the process of disembarking at the time).